Markant, D. & Hertwig, R. (2019). Rivals in the dark: Trading off strategic and environmental uncertainty. In R. Hertwig, T. Pleskac, T. Pachur, & the Center for Adaptive Rationality (Eds.), Taming uncertainty (pp. xx–xx). Boston, MA: MIT Press. doi:XXXXXXX


Welcome to the interactive element for Chapter 12. This element will allow you to experience the tradeoff between environmental and strategic uncertainty when competing over options of uncertain value. You will play a game that is a version of the Rivals in the Dark task described in Chapter 12.

In each round of the game you will see a set of options (boxes) and a list of competitors. Each option probabilistically generates rewards. Every time you click an option you will see a number, which is the number of points randomly drawn from the distribution for that option. Your goal is to claim options that generate higher point values.

As you learn about the options your competitors will be doing the same. If a competitor decides to claim an option it will no longer be available for you to select.

To get started, pick the number of options and competitors. The ratio between options and competitors impacts the amount of competitive pressure: as there are more competitors relative to the number of options, there is increasing pressure to claim an option even if you are uncertain about its value.

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